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The contrasting positions of Jensen Huang and Elon Musk reveal the power dynamics behind corporate boardrooms and raise an important question about who really controls these companies. Why can one billionaire founder be forced out of his own company while another continues to exercise enormous influence despite persistent controversies surrounding his private life and his association with Jeffrey Epstein? The answer may have less to do with personal morality and more to do with board composition, voting rights, ownership structures and the distribution of corporate power.
Jensen Huang's departure from NVIDIA on 12 November 2026 followed an escalating controversy involving alleged extramarital relationships, corporate governance concerns and questions about possible Chinese intelligence connections. But the decisive factor was arguably NVIDIA's board structure. According to Reuters, NVIDIA's board had 11 directors, and its bylaws allowed a majority to remove Huang as CEO. He did not possess sufficient voting control to override the board. Once confidence among directors deteriorated, his position became vulnerable.
The composition of NVIDIA's board is particularly important. Its directors included Harvey Jones, Tench Coxe, John Dabiri, Dawn Hudson, Melissa Lora, Stephen Neal, Brooke Seawell, Aarti Shah, Mark Stevens and Suzanne Nora Johnson, alongside Huang before his departure. These individuals brought backgrounds in venture capital, technology, law, academia and corporate management. Huang was the company's founder and dominant executive, but he was not the sole authority over its governance. The board could ultimately decide that protecting the institution required removing its most influential individual.
Elon Musk's position at Tesla is different, although not as simple as suggesting that he personally controls every board vote. Tesla has a nine-member board chaired by Robyn Denholm. Its directors include Musk, his brother Kimbal Musk, JB Straubel, Ira Ehrenpreis, James Murdoch, Joe Gebbia, Jack Hartung and Kathleen Wilson-Thompson. Denholm chairs the board and several important committees, while independent directors occupy the audit, compensation and governance committees. Formally, Musk cannot simply dismiss directors or overrule the board by virtue of being CEO.
However, Musk's substantial shareholding gives him considerable influence over shareholder decisions. Tesla's 2026 regulatory disclosures put his beneficial ownership at approximately 20.3%, subject to the treatment of particular awards and voting arrangements. This is not majority control, but it is a significant voting position. His influence is also reinforced by his commercial importance, public following and ability to mobilise shareholder support. Removing Musk would therefore be a much more complicated undertaking than simply obtaining a majority of board votes.
The contrast becomes even more striking when SpaceX is considered. Reuters reported in 2026 that SpaceX's proposed IPO structure would give Class B shares ten votes each, compared with one vote for ordinary Class A shares. Musk and other insiders would retain substantial voting control. According to the regulatory disclosures, Musk would have approximately 83.8% of the voting power, allowing him to exert decisive influence over the board and corporate decisions. This is a fundamentally different governance arrangement from NVIDIA's. It is important, however, not to confuse SpaceX's proposed voting structure with Tesla's: they are separate companies with different ownership arrangements.
This brings us to the Epstein controversy. Musk's name appeared in documents released in January 2026, including email exchanges discussing possible visits to Epstein's private island. These communications warrant scrutiny, but they do not establish that Musk visited the island, had affairs there or participated in Epstein's criminal activities. Nor has his association with Epstein resulted in an established finding of corporate misconduct comparable to the governance concerns reported in Huang's case. The distinction between allegations, association and proven wrongdoing must be maintained.
The deeper issue is that corporate accountability depends heavily on the balance of power between founders, shareholders and directors. Huang was extraordinarily influential but remained subject to a board capable of removing him. Musk, by contrast, has a substantial shareholder base, enormous commercial influence and, at SpaceX, a governance structure designed to preserve founder control. Even when controversies arise, the practical ability to remove a founder depends on who controls the votes.
The difference between Huang and Musk is not necessarily that one behaved worse than the other. It is that their companies have different governance structures and different distributions of power. Huang's resignation reveals that building a multitrillion-dollar company does not guarantee control over its board. Musk's position demonstrates how ownership, voting arrangements and founder influence can make corporate leadership considerably more difficult to challenge.
That is perhaps the real lesson of these two cases: in modern corporate capitalism, accountability is not determined by public outrage alone. It is determined by who controls the boardroom, who commands the shareholder votes and who has the power to decide whether a founder stays or goes.